IFREE/ESI Lecture Series Presents: Dr. Gary Charness “Experimental Games on Networks”

September 7, 2012

Sept. 7th, Gary Charness, Ph.D. – Experimental Games on Networks

Abstract: We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental network games. We vary two important factors: (a) actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and (b) subjects have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Play conforms strongly to the theoretical predictions, providing an impressive behavioral confirmation of the Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) model. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, even with incomplete information. We find that under complete information, subjects typically play the stochastically-stable (inefficient) equilibrium when the game involves strategic substitutes, but play the efficient one with strategic complements. Our results suggest that equilibrium multiplicity may not be a major concern. Subjects’ actions and realized outcomes under incomplete information depend strongly on both the degree and the connectivity. When there are multiple equilibria, subjects begin by playing the efficient equilibrium, but eventually converge to the inefficient one.

Bio: Professor Gary Charness specializes in experimental and behavioral research. He has published his research in a wide variety of journals, including Econometrica, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, and Management Science. He received his B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Michigan, and his Ph.D. in Economics from The University of California at Berkeley. He joined the UCSB faculty in 2001, after a previous appointment at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. He has held visiting scholar and professor positions at the University of California at Santa Cruz and The Ohio State University, and also received a fellowship from the MacArthur Foundation.